In the weighted average, these 50 players scored about 52 goals above expectation for Real Madrid or Barcelona, and they scored about 41 goals above expectation for other clubs. This result suggests that most—perhaps 75 to 80 percent—of the “superteam” effect is a relatively simple equation. Real and Barca spend large amounts of money to buy players who are excellent finishers as well as being elite in other aspects of the game, and there is nothing surprising about guys who cost over $50 million clinically dispatching a few extra chances. They do the same playing for Udinese, Arsenal or Valencia.
While this is broadly true at the population level, there is one striking exception. Gonzalo Higuaín has simply been a different kind of player since leaving Real Madrid for Napoli two years ago. He had been one of the most deadly finishers in La Liga, scoring 75 non-penalty goals from 263 shots, beating his expected goals (58 xG) by nearly 20. For Napoli Higuaín has scored 27 of 191 shots, exactly matching his 21 expected goals. Indeed, Higuaín accounts for a significant amount of the variation between “superteam” finishing and “other club” finishing. While greats like Gareth Bale, Luis Suárez and Zlatan Ibrahimovic have maintained finishing rates around their career averages, this is not true for every player equally.
The engine of this return to form has been Philippe Coutinho. When Rodgers first instituted the 3-4-2-1, the headline change was the use of Raheem Sterling in a lone striker position. Yet it has become clear that Coutinho’s role is the indispensable one. The Brazilian playmaker has typically been joined by a goal scorer (usually Adam Lallana) in the duo behind the striker, meaning that Rodgers’ trust is on Coutinho to carry the creative load.
We can see the extent of the Brazilian’s contributions by looking at the passes he has attempted and completed into dangerous areas. When a pass is completed into a region that includes the center of the penalty area and extends a little past the top, there is a chance of at least 1 in 3 that this pass will lead to a shot attempt. The map shows the likelihood of a shot resulting from an attacking move following a completed pass to any location on the pitch. The red zone in the center of the box is clearly distinguishable.
As usual, Barcelona fill the center of the penalty area with good chances. No other club in Europe has as many shot attempts from the danger zone in league play. Barcelona have attempted 216 DZ shots; England’s Manchester City have the second-most (194) but City have played two more matches than Barcelona.
The key to Barcelona’s dominance in attack is simple. Their front line of Lionel Messi, Neymar and Luis Suárez has no equal in world football on paper, but what is impressive here is how Suárez has been integrated into the attack without taking opportunities away from either Messi or Neymar. In fact, he seems to have made them both better. It was to be expected that Suárez (3.1 per 90) would attempt and assist more danger zone shots on a per-minute basis than his predecessor, Alexis Sánchez (2.4 per 90). But strikingly Messi and Neymar have also picked up in chance production at the same time.
Published at ESPN.
Furthermore, Tadic was heavily involved in Twente’s attack beyond just attempting shots. I built a statistic for involvement in build-up play which measures how often a player contributes to the open-play attacking move that led to a quality chance. If he completes a pass or a cross, or wins the ball with a tackle or interception in the build-up to a shot, he gets credit for being involved. Tadic led the Eredivisie in expected goals chance involvement by a significant margin.
When Southampton purchased their Tadic they were not only buying a player with impressive goal and assist numbers, but a player whose underlying stats reflected his consistent contributions to his team’s attack. When scouting for bargains, this sort of well-rounded contribution to the attack is precisely what you want to look for.
Published at SB Nation.
Perhaps the most striking thing about Barcelona’s clinical striking is that it’s a consistent aspect of their game all over the pitch. Whether shot created comes from directly on top of the goal mouth or 25 yards out, they are more likely to convert than anyone else in La Liga. There is no region of the pitch where Barcelona don’t score more goals than would be expected.
Published at SB Nation.
I could only identify an effect with samples of minimum 100 shots, and even then the effect is not overwhelming. (See Nerdery section below for more.) If a player has taken 20 or 30 shots but converted either a lot more or a lot fewer than you’d expect, you’re still best referring to the studies showing no y-to-y correlation in shot conversion. Probably it’s been a fluke. There’s a possibility that it isn’t, but the only good way to identify that statistically is with several seasons of data. So we need to be very careful about concluding that a player really has a significant shooting skill.
When you aggregate data and collect groups of similar players, there emerges a clear tendency of higher-volume shooters and more advanced players to finish their chances more efficiently. I think this is a selection effect. Football managers recognize which of their players have the best striking skills and arrange tactics to get those players the most chances.
Published at SB Nation.
It isn’t precisely true that no one expected Liverpool to be title contenders. A number of statistical models viewed Liverpool as one of the best sides in the EPL last year. My expected goals ratio, a ratio of expected goals scored to expected goals allowed based on chance quality, rated Liverpool as the league’s best side last season.
The method behind expected goals, which you can read about in the “Shot Matrix” articles linked above or at the EPL Advanced Stats page, is pretty simple. For each chance, I estimate the average probability of a goal being scored, based on location on the pitch, whether the shot is taken with the head or the foot, whether it is a free kick or from open play, and the type of pass that assisted the shot. Over time, these estimates of chance quality are a better metric of team quality than raw goals scored or simple shot totals. And in the case of Liverpool, based on their expected goals in 2012-2013, the underlying stats expected this club to be among the best in the Premier League.